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Abstract
It is often purported that unusually dry conditions provoke riots by intensifying
the competition for water. The present paper explores this hypothesis, using data
from Sub-Saharan Africa. We rely on monthly data at the cell level (0:5  0:5
degrees), an approach that is tailored to the fact that riots are short-lived and local
events. Using a drought index to proxy for deviations of the actual climatic water
balance from the normal one, we nd that a one-standard-deviation fall in the index
(signaling drier conditions) raises the likelihood of a riot in a given cell and month
by 8.5 percent. We further observe that the e¤ect of unusual dryness is substantially
larger in cells that combine a low supply of blue water with signicant agricultural
activity, a nding that supports the relevance of the water-competition mechanism.
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1 Introduction
Water scarcity is often considered to be an important factor behind social conict and
violent clashes in less advanced economies. A typical example of extensive violence over
water was observed in 2012 in Kenya, where more than one hundred people died in riots
involving farmers and cattle herders (Gleick and Heberger, 2014). This conict was part
of a long-running dispute between the Pokomo people mostly farmers near the Tana
River and the Orma people, who are seminomadic cattle herders. Back in 2001, at least
130 people were killed in a string of clashes between the same two communities over the
access to a river. There is a worry that we will see an increase in the frequency of such
sub-national conicts. For instance, Peter Gleick, president of the Pacic Institute an
institute tracking instances of conict over water resources recently stated:1
I think the risk of conicts over water is growing not shrinking because
of increased competition, because of bad management and, ultimately, because
of the impacts of climate change. [...] The biggest worry today is sub-national
conicts: conicts between farmers and cities, between ethnic groups, between
pastoralists and farmers in Africa, between upstream users and downstream
users on the same river.
This paper empirically investigates the link between unusually dry weather condi-
tions and violent clashes by using geo-referenced data from Sub-Saharan Africa over the
1990-2011 period.2 Sub-Saharan Africa is particularly vulnerable to unusual dryness: As
much as 95% of the crops that are cultivated today are rain-fed, while only 5 percent of
all cultivated land is suitable for irrigation (UNEP, 2007). Moreover, according to the
United Nations World Water Development Report (UNESCO, 2009), 340 million people
lack access to clean drinking water. Consequently, as illustrated by the above example,
subnormal levels of rainfall can easily increase resource competition over cropland, pas-
tures, and access to water and hence induce violent clashes as competing groups start
1See The Guardian article Why global water shortages pose threat of terror and war(Feb 9, 2014).
2While the data on violent clashes cover the period from 1990 to 2012, our main explanatory variable
a measure of abnormal water conditions is only available until 2011.
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to ght over a dwindling resource base.
Investigating potential causes of violent clashes, among them water stress, is important
for a variety of reasons. First, violent clashes which we will refer to as riots in what
follows are a frequent phenomenon. Our dataset suggests that in the 1990-2011 period
Sub-Saharan Africa saw 1,738 events of rioting (compared to 41 civil conicts or wars,
according to the UCDP/PRIOArmed Conict Dataset). Second, riots are often associated
with a high number of fatalities. We observe at least one fatality in about 52% of the
cases, with a median of 6 and an average of 66 deaths per event. Finally, next to the cost
in terms of human lives, riots are also costly in economic terms. They disrupt private
economic activity and basic government functions; as a result, frequent rioting is a severe
obstacle to economic development, particularly in poor places.3
Our empirical analysis is based on geographically and temporally disaggregated data.
Geographically disaggregated means that we take as units of observation subnational cells
of 0:50:5 degrees. Temporally disaggregated refers to the fact that we focus on monthly
observations. This combination of a very ne temporal and geographical resolution allows
us to tackle the specicities of the phenomenon at hand. In particular, our data suggest
that riots are short-lived and spatially conned events. Using geo-referenced data from
the Social Conict in Africa Database (SCAD), we see that riots are up spontaneously
and tend to die down quickly: 91% of all riots in our sample do not last for longer than
a week. It is further clear that riots are local events: When there is a riot in one cell,
94.3% of neighbouring cells have no incident reported in the same month and 98.2% of
neighbouring cells have no incident reported in the preceding month. There is thus no
evidence for spatial e¤ects to play a dominant role in our data.4
The empirical question we are interested in is how deviations of the actual climatic wa-
ter balance from normal levels a¤ect the level of rioting in a cell. Following a recent series
of papers (among them Harari and La Ferrara, 2014; Couttenier and Soubeyran, 2014),
3For anecdotal evidence, see the Economist article A cracked nation holds its breath(Jan 17, 2008),
which describes how the riots that erupted in Kenya in late 2007 imperiled the countrys economy.
4The nding that riots are spatially conned events is consistent with results in Harari and La Ferrara
(2014). Relying on the ACLED database, Harari and La Ferrara do not nd any evidence for spatial
spillovers in riots (while they do nd spillovers in other types of conict, such as civil conict or war).
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we use a drought index as a proxy for the actual water balance. Our main explanatory
variable is the Standardized Precipitation-Evapotranspiration Index (SPEI) constructed
by Vicente-Serrano et al. (2010). As the name implies, SPEI is a drought index re-
ecting the climatic water balance, i.e., the monthly di¤erence between precipitation and
potential evapotranspiration. SPEI is expressed in units of standard deviations from the
long-run average, so that a positive (negative) value in a given month means an above
(below) normal water balance. In addition to SPEI, our main explanatory variable, most
specications include region-by-month, country-by-year, and cell xed-e¤ects. Therefore,
our empirical analysis exploits monthly changes in the (exogenous) water balance in a cell
to explain the within-cell variation in local violence.
The raw version of our dataset covers all 0:5 0:5 degree cells in Sub-Saharan Africa.
However, riots can hardly occur in sparsely populated zones, in which the formation
of crowds with coordinated beliefs is highly unlikely.5 Our baseline specication thus
focuses on a sub-sample of cells with a population above a certain threshold (the 6th
decile, evaluated at the country level). We do, however, provide estimates for various
alternative thresholds (as well as for the full sample). Our baseline estimates suggest that
a one-standard-deviation fall in SPEI increases the likelihood of rioting by 8:5 percent
for the average cell in our restricted sample. If we restrict our sample to cells with a
population above the 90th percentile, the corresponding number is 25:2 percent.
By using additional cell characteristics, we are able to learn more about the channels
through which the actual water balance inuences the probability of riots. In particular,
we nd that a below-normal climatic water balance has a far stronger impact on the level of
rioting in cells characterized by a relatively low supply of blue water (i.e., in cells with little
underground water and few lakes or rivers). Moreover, the impact on the level of rioting
is even stronger in cells that combine a relatively low supply of blue water with signicant
agricultural activity; and in cells that combine a relatively low supply of blue water
with ethnic diversity. So it appears that a negative shock to the climatic water balance
has a particularly strong impact in (blue-)water-scarce areas that exhibit substantial
5When it comes to individual rioting decisions, coordination in beliefs is important: An agent decides
to incur the cost of rioting only if many others are doing so at the same time.
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water demand or that host potentially competing groups. These ndings support the
conjecture introduced in the beginning that unusually dry weather conditions breed
local violence by triggering competition over scarce water resources. To the best of our
knowledge, we are the rst to provide evidence for this purported competition-for-water
mechanism in a large scale empirical study.6
When studying the causes of internal conict, it is important to distinguish between
di¤erent forms of violence. So far, researches have mainly focused on the impact of
weather shocks on internal conict between organized groups, such as coups, rebellions,
or revolutions.7 However, case-study accounts of conict related to scarcity of water and
land often refer to outbursts of violence between di¤erent local communities (based on
ethnic or other a¢ liations), i.e., to riots that take place without explicit state involvement
(see, e.g., UNEP, 2007 or Gleick and Heberger, 2014). Contrary to coups or revolutions
where a potentially persistent ght occurs between at least two organized groups over the
control of the state riots are characterized by low requirements regarding organization
and funding rather than cohesive actor formation and organized warfare. As a result,
riots are up immediately, are geographically conned, and tend to die down quickly. Our
empirical strategy, which is based on a very ne temporal and geographical resolution, is
exactly tailored to these characteristics of riots.
This paper is related to a vast empirical literature on the impact of shocks related to
weather anomalies on violent conict (e.g., Miguel et al., 2004; Burke et al., 2009; Ciccone,
2011; Dell et al., 2014; OLoughlin et al., 2014). By using a temporally and geographically
disaggregated empirical strategy, and by relying on a drought index to proxy for weather
anomalies, our work has a close link to recent contributions by Theisen et al. (2011),
Harari and La Ferrara (2014), Couttenier and Soubeyran (2014), and Hodler and Raschky
6Sekhri (2014), using survey data from Indian villages, shows that better access to ground water
reduces the number of disputes among farmers over irrigation water. However, neither riots nor the
actual climatic water balance play any role in Sekhirs (2014) empirical analysis.
7Coups and rebellions are attempts by the armed forces (coup) or by an organized group of civilians
(rebellion) to oust the incumbent government. Revolutions, on the other hand, may also lead to a fun-
damental change in political institutions. According to the usual denition, a conict between organized
groups is called a civil conict if it causes at least 25 battle deaths in a single year and it is called a
civil warif this number is greater than 1000 (see Blattman and Miguel, 2010).
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(2014).8 However, while all of these papers focus on extensisve and potentially sustained
conicts between organized groups, our focus here is on riots, i.e., on localized events that
are up spontaneously and die down quickly.9 Consistent with this pattern, our empirical
analysis relies on highly disaggregated data, both in terms of space (we focus on cells of
0:5  0:5 degrees) and in terms of time (we use monthly observations). This high level
of disaggregation further allows us to shed light on a specic mechanism linking unusual
dryness to local violence competition over scarce resources that di¤ers from the usual
opportunity-cost-of-ghtingmechanism.
Other papers considering riots include Hendrix and Salehyan (2012) and Aidt and Leon
(2014). The former explores whether deviations from normal rainfall patterns increase the
likelihood of various types of disruptive events (including incidents of organized and armed
violence, but also including spontaneous events like demonstrations, strikes, and riots).
Aidt and Leon (2014), on the other hand, focus on the relationship between rioting and
democratic transitions. Both papers, however, rely on yearly observations at the country
level and do not focus on the mechanism we elicit here.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The upcoming section discusses potential
linkages between water shocks and riots and explains our empirical strategy. Sections 3
and 4, respectively, describe the dataset and our empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Hypothesis and Empirical Strategy
There exists an extensive literature emphasizing that an unusually dry conditions, po-
tentially in combination with other social factors, can contribute to the outburst of riots
(see, e.g., Hendrix and Salehyan, 2012, and the literature cited therein). The main line
of argumentation is that unusual dryness may lead to conict among local consumers of
8A complementary literature explores how enduring structural problems (as distinguished from tran-
sitory shocks) a¤ect the incidence of conict. Part of this literature also relies on subnational data from
Africa. Examples include Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2012) who focus on the consequences of ethnic
partitioning; and Besley and Reynal-Querol (2014) who explore the role of historical conicts.
9The present focus on water competition and riots is also an important factor distinguishing our
study from recent work by Wischnath and Buhaug (2014) who use subnational data from Indian states
to explore how uctuations in food production a¤ect the severity of ongoing conicts.
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water, especially among those who depend on water as an input into production. Water is
a major input for agricultural producers and pastoralists, as well as for manufacturing and
mining. Unusually dry weather conditions may lead to tougher competition over access to
surface water and wells, potentially resulting in an outburst of violence within professional
groups (e.g., pastoral conicts) or between professional groups (e.g., between pastoralists
and farmers). Butler and Gates (2012), developing a model of conicts between pastoral-
ist groups in East Africa, show that such an outcome can be expected in particular if
the shock leads to, or amplies, severe resource asymmetries between competing groups.
Moreover, many actual accounts of riots (of which an example is given in the introductory
paragraph), as well as theoretical considerations,10 suggest that the impact of a negative
water-balance shock on violence may be amplied by ethnic divisions.
Finally, unusually dry conditions may spark riots by inducing (short-range) migration
within a certain geographical region. Gleditsch et al. (2007) point out that such
[Environment-induced migration] may lead to social tensions and sporadic
violence in receiving areas, but is not likely to cause sustained, organized
armed conict.(p. 4)
Motivated by these arguments, Section 4 explores whether an immediate impact of a
negative water-balance shock on sporadic violence i.e., riots can be identied in Sub-
Saharan Africa. To do so, we rely on monthly data at the cell level (0:50:5 degrees). Our
baseline regression relates the level of rioting in a given cell and month to a proxy of the
monthly deviation of the actual water balance from the normal one. This disaggregated
approach is tailored to the frequent and localized nature of the phenomenon. Unlike
conicts between organized groups, which are usually measured as binary responses at
higher levels of aggregation, riots are up immediately in response to a stimulus, are short-
lived, occur multiple times in a year, and are usually conned to the region a¤ected by
the stimulus. Although we do run regressions on the full sample, our preferred estimates
will be based on a subsample of more populous cells (see Section 3). The reason is that
10Esteban et al. (2012) argue that in cases where the prize to be won is private (e.g., better access to
water), ethnic divisions help restrict the benets to smaller groups and hence facilitate mobilization.
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a basic requirement for riots to emerge, namely the presence of a substantial number of
individuals with coordinated beliefs, is hardly met in cells that are sparsely populated.
To uncover any possible e¤ect of the actual water balance on the level of rioting, we use
the Standardized Precipitation-Evapotranspiration Index (SPEI) constructed by Vicente-
Serrano et al. (2010). SPEI is a drought index that reects a cells climatic water balance
(see again Section 3). An index value greater (less) than zero indicates an above-normal
(below-normal) water balance. Apart from time-invariant factors such as latitude, SPEI is
constructed from weather information only. It is therefore plausible to assume that SPEI
is exogenous, i.e., that uctuations in weather conditions are independent of any other
potentially confounding factor. Nevertheless, we do control for other factors that possibly
inuence the level of rioting by using a rich set of xed e¤ects. In particular, we include
cell xed-e¤ects to control for time-invariant cell characteristics that may a¤ect rioting
and water. We also rely on region-by-month xed e¤ects to control for region-specic
seasonal patterns in the data. Specically, the region-by-month xed e¤ects account for
the possibility that over our observation period of 22 years the deviation of SPEI from
its long-run average and the prevalence of rioting show systematic monthly patterns.
Finally, we include country-by-year xed e¤ects to account as much as possible for time-
varying factors at the country-level, such as signicant changes to national policies (which
usually do not occur at a frequency higher than yearly). In essence, by including a uniquely
rich set of xed e¤ects, we explain a large share of the variation in riots. As a result, we
argue that our estimates for SPEI identify the causal e¤ect of SPEI on riots, i.e., that
they are not biased by any unobserved third factor.
To sum up, our baseline regression equation to be estimated in Section 4 is given by
Rit =  + SPEIit + i + rm + cy + "it; (1)
with i and t standing for cell and month, respectively. Rit is a measure of the level of
rioting; i refers to cell (i) xed e¤ects, while rm and cy denote, respectively, the region-
by-month (r andm) and the country-by-year (c and y) xed e¤ects (with the regions being
Eastern, Western, Southern, and Middle Africa). The parameter of interest in equation
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(1) is , which is expected to have a negative sign.
In addition to equation (1), we estimate specications that include interaction terms.
The prime objective is to shed light on the mechanism linking riots to deviations (captured
by SPEI) of the actual water balance from its normal level. Among others, we estimate
specications that include an interaction term involving SPEI and a measure of the supply
of blue water in a cell;11 specications that include a triple interaction involving SPEI,
the supply of blue water, and the prevalence of cropland in a cell; and specications that
include a triple interaction involving SPEI, the supply of blue water, and ethnic diversity.
By including these interaction terms, we want to explore whether a possible e¤ect of SPEI
on riots may work through the competition-for-waterchannel. If this were the case, the
signs of the coe¢ cients should be negative: Following the logic of diminishing returns,
the actual climatic water balance (i.e., precipitation less potential evapotranspiration)
should matter more for the current production and hence the competition-induced level
of rioting in cells that are characterized by a low supply of blue water (i.e., in cells
which have only little surface and ground water). However, the actual water balance
should be expected to matter even more if the supply of blue water is relatively low and
the agricultural sector is relatively important (because water serves as a major input into
agricultural production); similarly, the actual water balance should be expected to have a
particularly strong e¤ect if the the supply of blue water is relatively low and and the cell
is ethnically diverse (because ethnic divisions may facilitate the mobilization of groups
that participate in a riot). Finally, we consider a number of further possible interaction
e¤ects. For instance, we explore whether the e¤ect of SPEI is stronger in months that are
part of the growing season or in cells that are closer to urban centers.
Given the structure and the size of the raw dataset (long panel with more than
2,000,000 observations), we employ linear panel estimation throughout. That is, we fol-
low the recent conict literature (e.g., Harrari and La Ferrara, 2014; Hodler and Raschky
2014) in relying on a linear probability model when using a binary dependent variable.12
11This is essentially a time-invariant estimate of the total quantity of fresh surface and ground water
that is available to catchment before any uses are satised (see again Section 3).
12The present dataset leaves us with two particular challenges that make the nonlinear estimation of
the parameters of interest problematic. First, due to the highly disaggregated nature of our data, riots
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3 Data
3.1 Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics
Our empirical analysis relies on several data sources. The information used to construct
our dependent variables stems from the Social Conict in Africa Database (SCAD). SCAD
lists di¤erent types of social unrest (like strikes, demonstrations, or riots) starting from
1990 for all African countries with a population size of more than one million. The data-
base was compiled by Salehyan et al. (2012) and is based on newswires from Associated
Press and Agence France Presse. The data are geo-coded and contain detailed informa-
tion on, among other things, event type and duration. SCAD does not include, however,
violent events that are directly related to armed internal conicts. Such events are cov-
ered by the PRIO/Uppsala ACLED dataset, i.e., by the data source that is typically used
in the related conict literature. The type of violent clashes we consider here are riots.
SCAD denes a riot to be a distinct, continuous, and violent action toward members of a
distinct othergroup or government authorities. We construct three di¤erent dependent
variables at the cell-month level. The rst two variables, NoD and Inc, are measures of
the level of rioting. NoD is a count variable that gives the number of days with riots. Inc
reects riot incidence; it is a binary variable that equals one if we observe at least one
riot. The third dependent variable, Ons, reects riot onset; it is a binary variable that
equals one if we observe at least one riot in t, but none in t 1. The two binary dependent
variables are often used in the related conict literature.
The main explanatory variable is the Standardized Precipitation-Evapotranspiration
Index (SPEI), which was developed by Vicente-Serrano et al. (2010). SPEI is a drought
index that reects the climatic water balance at di¤erent time scales.13 We consider
happen to be relatively rare events (relatively rare in terms of the numbers of cells and time periods
we observe). King and Zeng (2001) show that this may lead to biased results when using non-linear
estimation. Second, we are dealing with a long panel (T = 264) and use a large number of cross-sectional
and time xed-e¤ects. In a recent paper, Fernandez-Val and Weidner (2014) show that this can cause
biased results in a nonlinear setting.
13There are alternatives to SPEI, in particular PDSI, which is used by Couttenier and Soubeyran
(2014). We chose to use SPEI because of its higher level of disaggregation. Given that we consider riots,
the high level of spatial and temporal disaggregation is an important part of our empirical strategy.
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the monthly climatic water balance, i.e., the monthly di¤erence between precipitation
and potential evapotranspiration (using SPEIbase V2.2). SPEI is a standardized variable
that expresses the water balance in units of standard deviations from the long-run average
(which is calculated over the 1901-2012 period). A value of zero means that the water
balance is exactly at its long-run average; a value of plus one (minus one) means that the
water balance is one standard deviation above (below) the long-run average, etc.
The climatic water balance is an important factor a¤ecting vegetation activity. Ac-
cording to Vicente-Serrano et al. (2012), the correlation between the water balance and
vegetation activity is particularly strong and immediate under arid, semi-arid, and sub-
humid conditions, i.e., under conditions present in many parts of Africas agricultural
regions. Moreover, in many African countries, production at the farm level is highly
diversied in terms of crops (see, e.g., Chavas and Di Falco, 2012), implying that the
growing and harvest season tends to cover a large part of the year. This, together with
the strong correlation between SPEI and vegetation activity, suggests that the actual wa-
ter balance matters for agricultural productivity throughout the year. The same holds for
other types of water-dependent economic activities, like pastoralism. So unusual dryness
can be expected to increase competition for water roughly all the year round.14
In addition to SCAD and the SPEI database, we work with a variety of other data
sources. Most importantly, we rely on data provided by Gassert et al. (2014) and Ra-
mankutty et al. (2008) to explore whether the impact of SPEI on riots possibly works
through the competition-for-water mechanism, as described in Section 2. Ramankutty et
al. (2008) is the source of the data on the share of cropland in each cell. Gassert and co-
authors provide estimates of the total supply of blue water (i.e., fresh surface and ground
water) that is available to a catchment (in our case, a cell) before any uses are satised.
More precisely, blue water (in m3) is calculated as all water owing into a catchment from
upstream catchments (net of estimated upstream consumption) plus any imports of water
to the catchment. Essentially, blue water includes rivers, lakes, and underground water,
i.e., water sources that particularly under unusually dry weather conditions become
14We do explore, however, whether the impact of SPEI on riots is stronger in the main growing season.
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important for irrigation, the watering of animals, and other productive uses.
We further rely on population data (Tollefsen et al., 2012; PRIO-GRID) as we
restrict our empirical analysis to areas with a certain population size. From the same
source, we make use of a number of other cell-level variables to explore additional possible
interaction e¤ects. These variables are: The number of distinct ethnic groups in a cell;
the share of arable land equipped for irrigation within each cell; the estimated cell-average
travel time (in minutes) by land transportation from the cell to the nearest major city;
and, for some robustness checks, the distance to the national capital.
To account for the main growing season in a cell, which we do in some of the es-
timates, we use growing seasons surfaces derived specically for Sub-Saharan Africa by
HarvestChoice (2010). HarvestChoice uses actual reectance values combined with green-
ing up/down data derived from MODIS satellite images. These data are available for four
years (2001-2004) and provide a comprehensive picture of the start and end days of the
growing season for each year based on the Enhanced Vegetation Index (EVI). The EVI is
a rened vegetation index that de-couples the canopy background signal and reduces
atmospheric inuences. The data sets were aggregated at the 10 10 km resolution and
analyzed together to determine the start and end dates for each calendar year and whether
the pixel represents a bimodal area (i.e., an area with two or more distinct growing sea-
sons). The annual values were then compared to determine a representation of the start
and end dates of the growing season for a given pixel.15 We use this pixel-level informa-
tion on start and end dates to determine the average growing seasonat the cell level
(0:5 0:5 degree).16 This, in turn, allows us to compute a monthly dummy equal to one
if a given month is part of the average growing season in a cell.
Finally, we rely on the relevant United Nations Statistics Division classication to
assign each 0:5  0:5 degree cell to a Sub-Saharan region (Eastern, Western, Southern,
15A detailed description of how these data were used to determine the start, end, length,
and modality of the growing season is available directly on the HarvestChoice website
(http://harvestchoice.org/labs/measuring-growing-seasons).
16We also experimented with two alternative denitions of the growing season. One was based on
median start and end dates. The other alternative was dened by the start and end dates of the main
crop. The exact denition of the growing season does not matter for the results in Section 4.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
NoD 0.002046 0.15998 0 31 2006120
Inc 0.000753 0.027434 0 1 2006120
Ons 0.000655 0.025594 0 1 2006120
SPEI -0.163 0.996 -8.506 6.68 1910722
Water 3017155.77 23618873.44 0 1159684096 1998667
Crop 0.083 0.138 0 1 1977080
Pop 76696.532 190084.118 0 5399045.5 2001571
Irrigation 0.959552 2.544508 0 32.868999 1091484
Travel Time 704.207773 751.274564 0 6133 2001632
Ethn Groups 1.756197 1.076215 1 7 1433466
Cap Dist 601.483731 398.630259 4 1941 2001632
Grow Season 0.350485 0.477122 0 1 2006120
Note : Summary statistics for the full sample. NoD: number of days with riots; Inc: binary indicator that equals one if at
least one riot is observed; Ons: binary indicator that equals one if at least one riot is observed in t, but none in t - 1; SPEI:
Standardized Precipitation-Evapotranspiration Index; Water: available water per capita (in m3/pop); Crop: share of land
used for growing crops or pasture; Pop: population size; Irrigation: irrigated area as share of cell area (in %); Travel Time:
travel time to nearest urban center (cell average, in minutes); Ethn Groups: number of ethnic groups in cell; Cap Dist:
distance to national capital (in km); Grow Season: dummy variable indicating whether month can be classied as part of
the growing season.
and Middle Africa), which allows us to construct the region-by-month xed e¤ects. Table
1 provides summary statistics for the variables used in our empirical analysis.
3.2 Geographical Characteristics of Rioting
Many regions in Sub-Saharan Africa are characterized by types of land that are hostile to
human settlement (e.g., deserts, regularly ooded areas, or dense forests). These regions
typically show a low populations density, implying that as discussed in Section 2 they
will hardly experience any riots. For this reason, we group cells according to the popula-
tion distribution for each country (i.e., we compute the di¤erent deciles for each country
separately) and focus on cells in which the population is greater than the population at a
specic decile of the relevant countrys distribution. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics
for cells which are, respectively, above the 1st, the 2nd,   , and the 9th decile.
Column 3 of the table shows that more than 82 percent of all observations with at
least one riot are covered by cells with a population greater than the population at the 6th
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics based on population deciles
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Decile N (cells) Rioting SPEI Cropland Population
1 6,810 .971542 -.15655722 .08757274 11221
2 6,062 .9569821 -.1516641 .09185871 16194
3 5,294 .943084 -.1424928 .09699274 21706
4 4,549 .9285241 -.13848273 .10282339 28095
5 3,802 .8762409 -.13378653 .1098709 37054
6 3,034 .8232958 -.12856168 .11767683 51319
7 2,278 .7372601 -.12379031 .12722936 72006
8 1,518 .6512243 -.1154652 .1386438 105547
9 756 .5201853 -.10765097 .15088922 172342
Note : The di¤erent rows show summary statistics for various variables when restricting the sample to cells with a population
greater than the population at certain deciles (listed in Column 1) of the relevant countrys distribution. Column 2 indicates
the number of observations that are left when focusing on cells with a population above a specic decile. Column 3 shows
the share of observations with at least one riot that are covered by the restricted sample. Column 4 indicates the average
SPEI for the restricted sample. Column 5 contains the average percentage of cropland in the restricted sample and Column
6 shows the average population of the cells that are at the respective decile.
decile of the relevant countrys distribution. When we take the 9th decile as the threshold,
the corresponding number is still 52 percent. It can also be seen that the average share
of cropland increases with the size of the population. While only an average of around 9
percent of the overall cell area is cropland when we exclude cells in the 1st decile, more
than 15 percent on average is used for growing crops when we focus on cells above 9th
decile. Evidently, being restrictive in terms of population size comes at the cost of losing
a substantial share of cells and to a lesser extent also of losing incidences of rioting.
In the following empirical analysis, we therefore focus on cells with a population greater
than the population at the 6th decile of the relevant countrys distribution. In doing so,
we still cover more than 82 percent of all observations with at least one riot. Imposing
this restriction implies that the share of observations with at least one riot rises from 0:08
to 0:16 percent, while the share of cells with at least one riot (over the entire period) rises
from 6:7 to 12:3 percent. At the same time, the average share of land used for growing
crops increases from less than 9 percent to about 12 percent. Note, however, that we also
report results that are based on di¤erent population restrictions, including the results we
obtain when using the full sample.
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4 Results
4.1 Main Results
Table 3 shows the results for the baseline specication when we restrict our sample to cells
with a population above the 6th decile (evaluated at the country level). The di¤erences
in the estimates between the alternative specications (Columns 13, 46, and 79) stem
from the use of di¤erent sets of xed e¤ects, as indicated by the lower half of Table 3.
As described in Section 2, i, rm; and cy stand for cell, region-by-month, and country-
by-year xed e¤ects, respectively (see also the notes at the bottom of the table). Table
8 in the Appendix displays results based on alternative population restrictions. These
additional results will be briey discussed in the following subsection.
The signs of the parameter estimates for SPEI shown in Table 3 are negative through-
out, as expected. In particular, there is a signicant negative relationship between SPEI
and the level of rioting: When we use Inc, the binary measure, as a proxy for the level of
rioting, the relationship is highly signicant; when we rely on NoD, the count measure,
the relationship is at least marginally signicant (note that the vast majority of rioting
incidences in our dataset 91% only last for a week or less). We further observe that a
drop in SPEI has a highly signicant impact on the onset of riots.
In terms of magnitude, the estimation results in Table 3 suggest that a one-standard-
deviation decrease in SPEI (signaling drier conditions) increases the probability of observ-
ing a riot in a given cell and month by 8.5 percent for the average cell in our restricted
sample.17 Similarly, a one-standard-deviation decrease in SPEI translates in an increase
in the number of days with riots in a given cell and month of 9 percent. This implies a
rather substantial e¤ect when calculated at the yearly level assuming that the change
in SPEI would be constant throughout the year and for all cells.
Having identied an e¤ect of the actual water balance on the current level of rioting,
17A one standard deviation below the mean in the SPEI increases the likelihood to observe a riot in
a cell in a month by 0.0132 percentage points. The unconditional probability of having a riot in a cell
(with population above the 6th decile) in a month is 0.0016. A drop of one standard deviation in the
SPEI thus increases the likelihood of having a riot on the average cell by around 8.5%.
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Table 3: Baseline specications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
NoD Inc Ons NoD Inc Ons NoD Inc Ons
SPEI -0.000358 -0.000132 -0.000134 -0.000361 -0.000130 -0.000133 -0.000367 -0.000131 -0.000133
(0.135) (0.009) (0.003) (0.130) (0.010) (0.004) (0.090) (0.007) (0.004)
N 773384 773384 773384 773384 773384 773384 773384 773384 773384
NoG 2939 2939 2939 2939 2939 2939 2939 2939 2939
Tmin 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Tmean 263.1 263.1 263.1 263.1 263.1 263.1 263.1 263.1 263.1
Tmax 264 264 264 264 264 264 264 264 264
i Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
rm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
cy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
m Yes Yes Yes
y Yes Yes Yes
Note : p-values in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the cell level. NoD: number of days with riots; Inc: binary
indicator that equals one if at least one riot is observed; Ons: binary indicator that equals one if at least one riot is observed
in t, but none in t - 1; N: number of observations; NoG: number of cells; Tmin, Tmean; and Tmax: minimum, mean, and
maximum number of months available for all cells in the sample. i: cell xed e¤ects; rm: region-by-month xed e¤ects;
cy : country-by-year xed e¤ects; m: month xed e¤ects; y : year xed e¤ects.
we are now interested in a possible mechanism linking the two variables. If unusually dry
weather conditions a¤ect the level of rioting by intensifying the competition for water, as
hypothesized in Section 2, we suspect the impact of SPEI on riots to be stronger in cells
with a relatively low supply of blue water and a relatively important agricultural sector
(which is a major consumer of water). Table 4 presents several specications testing
for the presence of such interaction e¤ects. Columns 19 of Panel A show results when
we include a simple interaction term SPEIWater(xth), where Water(xth) is a dummy
variable that equals one if the supply of blue water (in per-capita terms) is below the xth
percentile of our restricted sample, where x 2 f50; 25; 10g. We observe that blue water
scarcity signicantly increases the e¤ect of SPEI on riots, with the size of the increase
rising in water scarcity. For instance, the estimated marginal e¤ect of SPEI on Inc in cells
below the 25th percentile (Table 4, Panel A, Column 5) is more than three times larger
than the corresponding baseline estimate presented in Table 3, Column 2.
Panel B of Table 4 addresses the question whether the e¤ect of SPEI is even stronger in
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cells characterized by a combination of blue water scarcity and substantial agricultural ac-
tivity. This is in fact the case. The results in Columns 19 are based on specications that
include triple interactions of the form SPEIWater(10th)Crop(xth), where Crop(xth)
is a dummy variable that equals one if the share of cropland in a cell is above the xth
percentile of our restricted sample, where x 2 f10; 25; 50g: We observe that relative to
the baseline specications in Table 3 the e¤ect of SPEI is larger in cells that combine
a low supply of blue water with a relatively substantial share of cropland; moreover, the
increase in the impact of SPEI rises when we apply a stricter denition regarding what is
meant by a relatively substantialshare of cropland.18 Finally, a comparison of Panels A
and B shows that relative to cells with blue water scarcity but no particular importance
of cropland the e¤ect of SPEI is larger in cells that are characterized by both water
scarcity and a relatively substantial share of cropland.
We complete our analysis by testing whether ethnic diversity leads to a quantitatively
stronger relationship between unusual dryness and riots. Table 5, Panel A, shows the
results from estimating the baseline specication supplemented with a simple interaction
term SPEIED, where ED is a dummy variable that equals one if there is more than one
ethnic group in a cell. We observe that, in fact, the e¤ect of SPEI on riots is larger in cells
with more than one ethnic group (it is also interesting to see that the overall e¤ect of SPEI
becomes insignicant). Panel B of the table presents results based on specications that
include triple interactions of the form SPEIWater(xth)ED, where x 2 f50; 25; 10g.
Apparently, in cells with a comparatively low supply of blue water, ethnic diversity has
an even larger impact on the size of the marginal e¤ect of SPEI. Column 2 of Panel A
suggests that ethnic diversity raises the marginal e¤ect of SPEI on riot incidence by a
factor 3.5. However, according to Panel B, ethnic diversity matters generally more in cells
with a low supply of blue water. For instance, if we dene the threshold in this regard to
be the 25th percentile (Column 5), ethnic diversity raises the marginal e¤ect of SPEI by
a factor 7.2 in cells with a low supply of blue water.
18Note that we also nd negative and signicant e¤ects (for Inc and Ons) when we include simple
interaction terms of the form SPEICrop(xth).
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In sum, we consistently nd that unusually dry weather conditions have a stronger
e¤ect on the level of rioting when blue water is relatively scarce; the impact of SPEI is
even stronger when blue water scarcity is combined with a relatively strong agricultural
sector (i.e., when water is a particularly important input factor) or with ethnic diversity
(i.e., when mobilizing participants for a conict is relatively easy). These ndings are
supportive of the widely held belief that unusual dryness inuence the level of low-scale
violence through a competition-for-water mechanism.
4.2 Further Interactions
Besides blue water scarcity, the prevalence of cropland, and ethnic diversity, there may
be other factors inuencing to what extent the climatic water balance a¤ects the prob-
ability of riots. It is the purpose of this subsection to empirically explore a number of
such alternative factors. Following Harari and La Ferrara (2014), we start by looking at
the interaction between SPEI and a dummy variable Growing Season(which indicates
whether a particular month is part of the cells average growing season). The conjecture
is that actual water balance may have a stronger e¤ect on agricultural yields and hence
the competition for water within the average growing season than during the rest of the
year. This is, however, not the case in our data: The interaction SPEIGrowing Season is
insignicant (while SPEI remains signicant), as can be seen from Columns 13 of Table
6. The lack of a signicant interaction is probably less of a surprise when we consider
that as discussed in Section 3 agricultural production at the farm level tends to be
highly diversied in terms of crops (Chavas and Di Falco, 2012).
Diversication can also be observed at a higher level. Our data show that in many
cells the main crop varies substantially across the di¤erent sub-regions of a cell: We nd
that more than 60% of the cells in our sample include sub-regions which di¤er in the start
date of their growing seasons by more than 10 weeks.19 Moreover, neither pastoral water
conicts nor conicts over access to blue water for industrial production or household
19The average standard deviation of the starting week of the growing season within a cell is 7 weeks
(the growing season starts on average in week 16); the average standard deviation of the length of the
growing season within a cell is 9 weeks (the length of the growing season is on average 19 weeks).
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Table 6: Interaction e¤ects: Growing season
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NoD Inc Ons Inc Inc
SPEI -0.000562 -0.000133 -0.000134 -0.000144 -0.000228
(0.036) (0.035) (0.017) (0.958) (0.857)
. Growing Season 0.000554 0.00000311 -0.00000119
(0.120) (0.973) (0.989)
N 773384 773384 773384 55966 127519
Note : p-values in parentheses. All specications include cell (i), region-by-month (rm), and country-by-year (cy) xed
e¤ects. Columns 13 display the results for our baseline specication introducing an interaction e¤ect (dummy for growing
season x SPEI). Columns 4 and 5 show results for yearly data, i.e. when aggregating our monthly data at the yearly level.
Following Harari and La Ferrara (2014), we aggregated the SPEI index by only considering shocks during the growing
season. More specically, we count the number of growing season months in a year for which the SPEI is smaller than -1.
Finally, we calculate the share of growing season months for which the SPEI is below this threshold.
consumption are likely to be conned to the growing season.
We are also left with insignicant results when we aggregate our data on a yearly
level and use a specication that is similar to Harrari and La Ferrara (2014). The results
are shown in Column 4 (restricted sample) and Column 5 (full sample) of Table 6. We
suspect that this di¤erence between riots and civil conicts stems from the fact that the
two forms of conict are very di¤erent in nature, triggered by di¤erent mechanisms.
Table 7 reports results for specications that include further plausible interactions,
namely: The interaction between SPEI and the dummy variable Irrigation (equal to
one if the proportion of arable land in a cell equipped for irrigation is above the mean
of our sample) and the interaction between SPEI and the dummy variable Urban Area
(equal to one if the average travel time to the closest urban centre is less than 2 hours).
The numbers in Columns 13 of Table 7 do not suggest that a comparatively high
prevalence of irrigation systems would mitigate the impact of SPEI. A possible explanation
is that even among the cells with a comparatively high reliance on irrigation systems the
share of irrigated land is on average only 5.1%, reecting that the prevalence of irrigation
in Sub-Saharan Africa is the lowest of any region in the world (Burney et al., 2013).
Finally, Columns 46 of Table 7 suggest that SPEI has a stronger e¤ect on rioting in cells
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Table 7: Interaction e¤ects: Irrigation and distance from an urban center
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NoD Inc Ons NoD Inc Ons
SPEI -0.000349 -0.0000980 -0.0000867 -0.0000557 -0.0000622 -0.0000702
(0.276) (0.256) (0.262) (0.768) (0.092) (0.048)
. Irrigation -0.00120 -0.000114 -0.0000596
(0.380) (0.585) (0.744)
. Urban Area -0.00634 -0.00146 -0.00134
(0.096) (0.033) (0.031)
N 421741 421741 421741 773384 773384 773384
Note : p-values in parentheses. All specications include cell (i), region-by-month (rm), and country-by-year (cy) xed
e¤ects. The irrigation dummy is equal to one if the underlying variable is larger than the mean of the restricted sample.
The urban-area dummy is equal to one if the average travel time to the nearest urban center is less than two hours.
where the average travel time to the closest urban area is relatively short. This result
is consistent with the view that urban areas create a higher pressure on water resources
(thereby enhancing the competition for water) and provide fertile ground for riots as they
facilitate the formation of crowds.
4.3 Robustness
Tables 9 to 12 in the Appendix report the results of several robustness checks, including
di¤erent sample restrictions (from the full sample to the 9th decile of population).
Table 9 shows results when we control for the potential persistence of the dependent
variable,20 for lags and leads of SPEI, and for an interaction of SPEI with its rst lag.
According to Columns 13 and 79, the inclusion of various lags of the dependent vari-
able does not change the estimated impact of SPEI by much (in absolute terms, the point
estimates turn slightly bigger). However, one di¤erence worth noticing concerns the sta-
tistical signicance of the estimates relying on NoD, our count measure, as the dependent
variable. While the estimated impact of SPEI on NoD is only marginally signicant in
Table 3, it is highly signicant when we introduce lagged values of NoD. Note further that
20Given the long time dimension of our dataset (263 months on average) we employ standard xed-
e¤ects regression as the Nickell (1981) bias is negligible in our case.
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the inclusion of lags (Columns 36) and leads (Columns 1012) of SPEI does not substan-
tially a¤ect the estimated contemporaneous impact of SPEI either. As for the lags and
leads themselves, the estimates are rather small and no clear picture emerges. This is not
surprising as some factors used to calculate SPEI are time-invariant. The same applies
when including SPEI and the interaction between SPEI and its rst lag. The estimates
for the contemporaneous SPEI are comparable to previous specications in terms of size
and remain statistically signicant. The interaction term, however, is insignicant.
Table 8 returns to the baseline specication and reports ndings for alternative sample
restrictions. Being more restrictive in terms of population leads to higher parameter
estimates (in absolute terms), indicating a stronger e¤ect of SPEI in more populous cells.
For instance, when we include all cells above the 5th decile, a one-standard-deviation
decrease in SPEI rises the likelihood of observing at least one riot by 7:3 percent; when
only cells above the 9th decile are included, the corresponding number is 25:2 percent.
The baseline results are again conrmed when we estimate a standard rst-di¤erenced
(fd) specication, as shown in Columns 13 of Table 10. The fd-estimates are just slightly
more signicant, both in economic and statistical terms. Moreover, when we relate the
level of rioting, or riot onset, to changes in SPEI (i.e., SPEIt   SPEIt 1), we also tend
to nd a signicant negative relationship (see Columns 46 of Table 10).
Table 11 reports results for di¤erent types of standard errors. So far, all standard
errors have been clustered at the cell level. However, given the precision of our data in
terms of both space and time, di¤erent forms of spatial dependence and autocorrelation
may a¤ect standard errors. Columns 13 of Table 11 therefore report results based on
standard errors that are robust to spatial and temporal dependence (Driscoll and Kraay,
1998) and Columns 46 display results for classical heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation
consistent (HAC) standard errors (Newey and West, 1994). The table suggests that our
baseline results are highly robust to changes in the type of standard errors used.
Finally, Table 12 reports results based on non-linear specications, namely Negative
Binomial and Logit. These estimations are consistent with the results in the previous ta-
bles: Unusually dry weather conditions tends to increase the level of rioting. As expected,
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the e¤ect is stronger in quantitative terms when using non-linear specications (allowing
to control for the high number of zeros in the dependent variable). However, nonlinear
specications come at a cost, as discussed at the end of Section 2.
5 Conclusion
Violent and spontaneous clashes between di¤erent groups riots are a widespread phe-
nomenon in poorer places. It is undisputed that frequent outbursts of riots are an obstacle
to economic development as they disrupt commerce and basic government functions. Our
data from Sub-Saharan Africa suggest that riots are also costly in terms of human lives.
Over the 19902012 period, the average riot was associated with 66 fatalities.
Even though riots pose a serious problem in Africa and beyond, the internal-conict
literature has so far mostly focused on explaining conict between organized groups, such
as coups, rebellions, or revolutions. This paper, by contrast, explores a possible trigger of
riots. In particular, it empirically investigates how unusually dry weather conditions a¤ect
the level of rioting in a certain area. Anecdotal evidence suggests that unusual dryness
provokes riots by intensifying the competition over access to scarce water resources.
Our empirical strategy is precisely tailored to the phenomenon we study. Unlike civil
conicts, riots are short-lived and local events. We accommodate these specics by relying
on highly disaggregated data (monthly, at the 0:5 0:5-degree cell level). Our proxy for
weather anomalies is the SPEI drought index, which indicates the deviation of the actual
climatic water balance in a given cell and month form the balance that prevail on average
at this location and time. Moreover, we rely on a rich set of xed e¤ects, a strategy that
makes it highly plausible that any e¤ect of SPEI on the level of rioting we detect is in
fact causal. We nd that a one-standard-deviation decrease in SPEI rises the likelihood
of a riot in a given cell and month by 8:5 percent. Additional estimations support the
view that the actual water balance inuences the level of rioting through the competition-
for-water mechanism. In particular, we nd that unusually dry (wet) conditions have a
stronger postive (negative) impact on the level of rioting in cells that have a low supply
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of blue water and an even stronger impact in cells that combine a low supply of blue
water with a high demand for water (coming from agriculture).
Our empirical ndings have important policy implications. They suggest that, par-
ticularly in Sub-Saharan regions that combine a scarcity of blue water with signicant
agricultural activity, measures that improve the e¢ ciency of agricultural water usage yield
gains that go beyond the immediate impact on agricultural production and food security.
By lowering the demand for irrigation water, such measures can be expected to dampen
the e¤ect of unusually dry weather conditions on the ferocity of the competition for access
to water resources; as a result, improvements in the e¢ ciency of water usage may lead to
the additional gain of reducing the risk of violent clashes during droughts.
By exploring a specic trigger of riots, the present paper gives also rise to a number
of new questions that will be interesting to address. For instance, anecdotal evidence
suggests that big events like rebellions or revolutions are often preceded by periods
with high levels of rioting (while, of course, not all periods with high levels of rioting
are followed by rebellions or revolutions). So an obvious question would be whether we
nd such correlations in the data. Similarly, it would be important to have a model that
would allow us to explore the circumstances under which a series of riots is more likely
to escalate into a full-blown rebellion or revolution. Addressing these questions would
help to ll the void between research on rioting and the literature on conict between
organized groups. At the moment, we leave these questions to future research.
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Appendix
Table 8: Estimation results for di¤erent sample restrictions
NoD Inc Ons NoD Inc Ons NoD Inc Ons
spei -0.000134 -0.0000397 -0.0000448 -0.000126 -0.0000474 -0.0000511 -0.000136 -0.0000537 -0.0000582
(0.293) (0.078) (0.028) (0.347) (0.052) (0.021) (0.369) (0.048) (0.019)
N 1910722 1910722 1910722 1739426 1739426 1739426 1550930 1550930 1550930
Decile Full Full Full 1 1 1 2 2 2
NoD Inc Ons NoD Inc Ons NoD Inc Ons
spei -0.000156 -0.0000641 -0.0000692 -0.000158 -0.0000735 -0.0000796 -0.000263 -0.0000968 -0.000103
(0.378) (0.039) (0.014) (0.454) (0.040) (0.014) (0.174) (0.019) (0.006)
N 1353328 1353328 1353328 1163414 1163414 1163414 971081 971081 971081
Decile 3 3 3 4 4 4 5 5 5
NoD Inc Ons NoD Inc Ons NoD Inc Ons
spei -0.000430 -0.000168 -0.000173 -0.000537 -0.000247 -0.000245 -0.000997 -0.000480 -0.000437
(0.105) (0.009) (0.003) (0.119) (0.008) (0.003) (0.107) (0.006) (0.004)
N 580901 580901 580901 384091 384091 384091 186820 186820 186820
Decile 7 7 7 8 8 8 9 9 9
Note : p-values in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the cell level. NoD: number of days with riots; Inc: binary
indicator that equals one if at least one riot is observed; Ons: binary indicator that equals one if at least on riot is observed
in t, but none in t - 1; N: number of observations; Decile: population threshold (referring to the country-level distribution)
above which a cell is included in the sample. Full stands for the full sample without any restriction. All specications
include cell (i), region-by-month (rm), and country-by-year (cy) xed e¤ects.
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Table 10: Estimation results for rst-di¤erenced specications
NoD, fd Inc, fd Ons, fd NoD Inc Ons
SPEI, fd -0.000472 -0.000191 -0.000189 -0.000156 -0.000110 -0.000113
(0.037) (0.006) (0.004) (0.276) (0.006) (0.004)
N 769406 769406 769406 769406 769406 769406
Note : Columns 13 present results for the rst-di¤erenced specication excluding cell xed e¤ects (i), but including
region-by-month (rm) and country-by-year (cy) xed e¤ects. Columns 46 display estimates for the baselines specication
including the full set of xed e¤ects, but using the rst di¤erence of SPEI (SPEIit   SPEIit 1) instead of the level.
Table 11: Estimation results for di¤erent types of standard errors
NoD Inc Ons NoD Inc Ons
SPEI -0.000364 -0.000126 -0.000129 -0.000364 -0.000126 -0.000129
(0.111) (0.030) (0.020) (0.150) (0.003) (0.001)
N 773384 773384 773384 773384 773384 773384
Note : p-values in parenthesis. All specications include cell (i), region-by-month (rm), and year (y) xed e¤ects.
Columns 13 report specications using standard errors that are robust to spatial and temporal dependence (Discroll and
Kraay, 1998). Columns 46 show results for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors (Newey
and West, 1994).
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Table 12: Nonlinear specications, negative binomial and logit
NoD Inc Ons NoD Inc Ons
spei -0.0805 -0.0154 -0.0154 -0.0537 -0.0116 -0.0116
(0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.060) (0.024) (0.024)
N 93458 93458 93458 127266 127266 127266
Note : p-values in parentheses. All specications include cell (i), month (m), and year (y) xed e¤ects. Columns 1 and
4 report results for the conditional xed-e¤ects negative binomial model with the number of days (NoD) with incidences of
rioting as the dependent variable. Likewise, columns 2, 3, 5 and 6 contain results for the conditional xed-e¤ects logit with
our indicator variables for riot incidences (Inc, columns 2 and 5) and onset (columns 3 and 6) as the dependent variables.
Parameter estimates represent average marginal e¤ects. The reduced sample size stems from the fact that rioting does not
a¤ect all cells and therefore cells without rioting are automatically omitted from the analysis.
33
